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KENtucKy LAw JouNAIL
STANDARD OF CARE OF STUDENTS -ASSUMPTION OF RISK
MISAPPLIED TO AVOID NEGLIGENCE ISSUE -WALL V GILL

The doctrine of assumntion of risk received a strange application in bvo
recent cases involving students; one a South Dakota case, and the other a Kentucky case which provoked this inquiry. In the latter case, Wall v. Gill,1 the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the patron of a beauty college, who received
a permanent wave at cost from an operator she knew to be a student, assumed
the risk of the student operator s inexperience, and could not recover damages
for burns. This holding does not appear startling on its face. But let us view
it in the light of established principles of negligence.
Negligence is conduct which falls below the standard established by law
for the protection of others from unreasonable risk of harm. The standard isthe
conduct of a reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances and is
essentially objective.' Although "circumstances" refers generally to external conditions, other factors are sometimes taken into consideration. "An exception is
made in favor of infants because their normal condition is one of incapacity and
the state of their progress toward maturity is reasonably capable of determination."' The conduct of an infant should be judged according to the average conduct of reasonable persons of his age and experience.' Other exceptional circumstances taken into account in applying the standard are the superior skill and
knowledge which the actor possesses or holds himself out to possess. In general,
the actor will be bound to exercise that superior degree of skill and knowledge
which he possesses,' or holds himself out to possess.
The student of a trade occupies a position that bears similarities to each of
these excentions. From one vantage he is a learner like the infant, immature
vocationally, but again one whose progress toward proficiency (in the skill he
practices) is capable of determnation. In another view, he possesses skills in
is trade superior to those of the ordinary man, which puts him in the position
of a skilled person. The truth of the matter is that he is both of these.
The precise issue of the degree of care the law imposes on students of a
trade does not appear to have been decided. It is submitted that the standard
should embody the principles of the two exceptions mentioned because of the
analogous position of the student to each, and because common justice demands it.
It is unreasonable, unless a vital public interest dictates otherwise, to hold a student to a degree of skill he cannot be expected to have, and yet he should not be
left to disregard whatever proficiency he has acqmred through traimng. The student should be held to the exercise of that superior degree of skill he possesses,
the standard, however, as in the case of infants, being that of a reasonable student
of similar experience and training. Of course, if the student holds himself out
to be a skilled operator, either expressly or by implication by undertaking to

'311 Ky. 796, 225 S.W 2d 670 (1949).
RPESTATEMENT, TonTs see. 282 (1932).
See Southeastern Geyhound Lines
v. Callahan, 244 Ala. 449, -- 13 So. 2d 660, 663 (1943); Diamond v. McDonald
Service Stores, 211 N.C. 632, -- 191 S.E. 358, 359 (1937).
1 PRossER, TORTS 225, 226 (1941). See Milkulski v. Morgan, 268 Mich. 314,
256 N.W 339 (1934); Armit v. Loveland, 115 F 2d 308, 311 (C.C.A. 3rd 1940).
'Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N. H. 501, -- 153 Atl. 457, 463 (1931).
'Instruction approved in Charbonneau v. MacRury, supra note 4.
'See Hams v. Fall, 177 F 79, 82 (C.C.A. 7th 1910).
Rann v. Twitchell, 82 Vt. 79, 71 Atl. 1045 (1909).

NOTES ON RECENT CASES
perform the work of one fully qualified without announcing that he is merely a
student, he may be held to the degree of skill required of persons regularly engaged in the trade.
Another principle of negligence particularly concerned with this case is that
of assumption of risk, that "one who voluntarily exposed himself or his property
to a known and appreciated danger due to the negligence of another may not
recover for injuries sustained thereby.
"S This doctrine seems to be bottomed
on the maxim volenti non fit inioria-that he who consents to an injury cannot
complain of it,' and the consent of the plaintiff to assume the risk of injury to
himself has the operative effect of relieving the defendant actor of his legal duty
toward the plaintiff insofar as the particular danger to which the plaintiff consents
is concerned."0
With these principles before us, the cases may now be examined in detail.
In Wall v. Gill, the defendant operated a college, licensed by state authorities,
wherein students were instructed in the art of beauty culture. In order that they
might gain practical experience, students were permitted to serve the public before
they completed the course and became licensed operators. However, state regulations required that signs be displayed announcing that the work was done by students, and that charges be limited to the cost of materials. The plaintiff, a patron,
who knew that the work was done by students at reduced prices, was being given a
permanent wave by a student operator when she was burned about the head and
received injuries for which she sued the proprietor of the college. She recovered
damages in the circuit court on the basis of the student's negligence, but the
judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals, primarily on the ground that she
assumed the risk of the student operator s inexperience.
The court, in discussing the case, said that "negligence does not become an
issue in the case in view of our theory of it."'
But assumption of risk is a technical legal phrase, although it has not always been so used. If it is to mean anything at all in a case where liability is dependent upon negligence, it should be
limited to the assumption of a risk created by some negligent act of the defendant.
Therefore, if the case is decided on the ground of assumption of risk, negligence
would always be at least a factor.'
In this case, the decision of the court should have turned on whether or not
" C.J.S. 849; Paul v. United States, 54 F Supp. 60 (E. D. La. 1943); Meyers
v. Paro Realty and Mortgage Co., 128 Conn. 249, 21 A. 2d 379 (1941).
9See Standard Oil Co. v. Titus, 187 Ky. 560, 563, 219 S.W 1077, 1078
(1920).
"0PRossEn, TORTS 377 (1941). See Silver v. Cushner, 300 Mass. 583, -16 N.E. 2d 27, 29 (1938).
"Wall v. Gill, 311 Ky. 796, 797, 225 S.W 2d 670, 671 (1949).
"Although there is no direct statement of it on record, it seems clear that
in legal writing the "risk" which is contemplated m assumption of risk has always
been regarded as a risk born of negligence. The definition of assumption of risk
quoted mfra, p. states this indirectly-"one who voluntarily exposed humself
to a
known danger due to the negligence of another
" 65
C.J.S. 849 [Italics, writer s). Assumption of risk is a defense to a case already
established on negligence, and if there had been no negligence there would be no
need for a defense.
The operative effect of assumption of risk is to dissolve the duty on the part
of the defendant and it may appear that if there were no duty there could be no
negligence, but it must become apparent that there must have been negligent conduct in the first instance creating a risk which the plaintiff could observe, appreciate and assume before the duty could be dissolved.
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there was negligence rather than on assumption of risk. In the opimon, the court
said, "It seems to us that under the facts of this case the appellee assumed the
risk of the student operator s inexperience. This risk can not be confined to less
professional hair styling, but must include all the dangers which might result from
treatment by one who is not yet qualified."'
The "risk" assumed appears to be
the danger which necessarily arises from the fact that the student is not as skillful
in the trade as a licensed operator. However, while the student is not held to
the standard of a licensed operator, he should be held to the standard of a reasonable student of similar experience and traimng. Therefore, the dangers necessarily attendant on the fact that students are not consummate in their skill are not
dangers created by negligence, and the doctrine of assumption of risk has no
application to them.
The very danger which the court points out and rules is assumed is one arsing from the natural state of vocational immaturity of the student and not from
negligence since, by application of the standard of care, a student would be
negligent only if he failed to conform to the conduct of a reasonable student
similarly situated and of a similar stage of development.
This distinction was highlighted by the ovmon in the South Dakota case,"
where the court recogmzed that the student could be free from negligence, but
nonetheless unfortunately misapplied the name of assumption of risk to the dangers
inherent in the fact that the student lacks the higher degree of skill required of
licensed operators. The case was one wherein the proprietor of a flying school
where the defendant was receiving flying lessons sought to recover the value of
an airulane which was crashed by the defendant in practicing one of his solo
lessons. The court said, "Frequently it is difficult to distingush between lack
of skill and carelessness in exercising a possessed skill"" and held that it was a
question for the jury whether the accident was caused by a lack of skill or a
failure to exercise the skill possessed, thus discermng the issue overlooked in the
Kentucky case. After exercising such perception, however, they sacrificed precision by apuarently rmsapplying the name assumption of risk to the dangers
created by the lack of skill,"8 which were not of negligent origin, as the court
recognized in distinguishing lack of skill from carelessness.
In Hall v. Hall," an earlier South Dakota case, the court again was careful
to distinguish between an accident due to the lack of skill of the driver of an
automobile, and one due to carelessness in exercising such skill and judgment as
she possessed'
" Wall v. Gill, 311 Ky. 796, 798, 225 S.W 2d 670, 671 (1949).
'Vee Bar Airport v. De Vries, -- S.D. 43 N.W 369 (1950).
"Id. at -- 43 N.W 2d at 370.
""Further, that any damage resulting to the appellant's airplane due to respondent's lack of skill is one of the risks appellant assumes in its training program." Ibid.
"63 S.D. 343, 258 N.W 491 (1935).
Defendant driver was not a student, having been driving for five years.
Plaintiff, her father, who was aware of the poor' qualities of her driving, was accompanying defendant as a guest when the accident occurred and he sustained
an injury. The defense was that he assumed the risk of accident. The court sent
the case back to the jury to determine whether the accident was due to lack of
skill, or carelessness in exercising whatever skill was possessed, which is a risk a
non-paying passenger does not assume.
Assumption of risk was correctly applied to the lack of skill m this case,
since the driver was not a student and not the subject of an exception such as
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Applying this distinction and the general negligence principles as set out
earlier to the Kentucky case, it appears that if the student exercises the skill of
a reasonable student of the same experience, he will not be negligent, and assumption of risk cannot be raised in the legal sense of a risk created by negligence. But what if the student has failed to observe the care required of students?
Tis is an event one does not ordinarily expect and therefore not a risk appreciated and acquiesced in by the plaintiff. The risk is not assumed because "One is
not required to anticipate that he will be exposed to a danger not*naturally incident to his situation, but ansing from negligence wuch he has no reason to
foresee."
It then follows that in the ordinary case involving students, unless the injured party knows that the student is acting carelessly, there will never be any
application of assumption of risk. Even though the same conduct might be negligent in a skilled operator, if the conduct of the student conforms to the standard
as applied to students it is not negligent and the technical phrase "assumption
of risk" cannot be applied to it. If the conduct does not come up to the standard,
then it is a risk the plantiff had no reason to foresee and could not, therefore, have
assumed, as she could reasonably expect the operator to use that degree of skill
ordinarily possessed by students.
It might be argued that this case must necessarily turn on assumption of
risk, because the court would have reached the opposite result and allowed recovery if plaintiff had not known that the operator was a student. Knowledge is
indeed an muortant element of assumption of risk. But assumption of risk applies
only where there is danger of misconduct by the operator, and not where there
is only knowledge of whatever dangers are inherent in his status as a student. The
real significance of knowledge, which in this case is knowledge of status, is its
effect on the degree of skill required. The actor will be bound to exercise that
superior degree of skill and knowledge which he possesses or holds himself out to
possess.' By assuming to give a permanent wave without any indication that he
was anyting but a licensed operator, the student operator would in effect hold
himself out to be fully qualified. This would result in a higher requisite degree of
proficiency by which standard his actions would be negligent, and the plaintiff
could therefore recover.
It is not suggested that the court in this case necessarily reached the wrong
result. The result is the same, whether the plaintiff fails to recover because she
assumed the risk or because the defendant was not negligent (as judged by the
student standard). The dictinction may at first thought seem one of nomenclature only, but it is important to preserve the distinction as one of theory, as it
can become a matter of substance if a case arises in which a student is actually
negligent in that his actions fall below the degree of proficiency required of students. A court, misled by past holdings that the plaintiff in such cases assumes
the risk of the student's inexperience, might fail to differentiate between a risk
born of inexperience and one born of negligence, and refuse recovery- or even if

applying to infants and students. The law does not allow persons to create m
their favor an exception to the standard of care simply because they never bother
to master the knack of the act they undertake to perform. She was negligent, but
because of the knowledge by her father of her continual negligence in driving he
cannot complain of an injury due to this lack of skill.
65 C.J.S. 852.
oHARPER, TonTs 162 (1933); PRossEr, ToRTs 236 (1941).
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they made such a distinction they might decide the question themselves as one
of clear-cut assumption of risk, while it is properly a matter for the jury under
a negligence instruction. It may be that in a popular sense one who patromzes a
beauty culture school for her hairdos "assumes the risk" of certain injuries, but
this means only that she takes a chance by placing herself in the hands of one
held to a lower degree of skill than a licensed operator. These cases at law should
hinge on the jury question of whether the student was negligent, and not on
assumption of risk.
GEORGE CREEDLE

EQUAL FACILITIES IN LEGAL EDUCATION UNDER THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE - EPPS V CARMICHAEL
Plaintiffs, who were Negro citizens and residents of North Carolina possessed
of requisite qualifications for admission to the Law School at the Umversity of
North Carolina, had applied there for admission. They were refused on grounds
of their race and color and because North Carolina had provided a Law School
for Negroes at the North Carolina College where they also had applied and had
been admitted as law students. Plaintiffs prosecuted a class action against the
President of the Umversity and others to restrain the defendants from refusing to
admit them. The Federal District Court held for the defendants, deciding that
the College Law School afforded the required "separate, but equal, facilities."
The court found that there would be no substantial advantage to the parties to be
admitted to the Umversity Law School, and that the disadvantages at the College
Law School for Negroes were more than offset by the disadvantages existing at
the Umversity Law School. Epps v. Carmichael.'
In Sweatt v. Painter,- another recent case involving the right of a Negro to
enter a white law school, the United States Supreme Court held that the legal
education offered the Negro petitioner in Texas was not substantially equal to that
which he would receive if admitted to the Umversity of Texas Law School; and
that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that he
be admitted to the Umversity of Texas Law School.
In both Texas and North Carolina, the legislatures had provided for segregation and forbade the attendance of Negroes at schools for white children.3
The action of a state in denying a citizen the opportunity to acquire a legal
education on the highest level, deprives him of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the Sweatt case' the trial court continued the petitioner s case for six months
to allow the state to supply substantially equal facilities. A law school was then
hurriedly established and the Texas trial court found that the new school satisfied
the Fourteenth Amendment by offering petitioner privileges, advantages, and opportunities substantially equivalent to those offered by the state to white students
at the University of Texas. The Supreme Court reversed the Texas decision be93 Fed. Supp. 327 (W.D. N.C. 1950).
339 U.S. 629 (1950).
'Johnson v. Board of Education, 166 N. C. 468, 82 S.E. 832 (1914).

TEX.

CONST. Art. VII, sees. 7, 14; THx. RE.v., Civ. STAT. arts. 2643b (Supp. 1949) 2719,

2900 (Vernon, 1925).
' Sweatt v. Painter, supra, note 2 at 633.

